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Employing a mean-variance framework and a multivariate GARCH
model, the degree of risk aversion exhibited by Irish fund managers is
estimated. Managers whose remit is ‘aggressive’ or ‘balanced’ management
of their portfolios have coefficients lying between 1.69–2.42 and 3.24–3.69
respectively.
I. Introduction
Risk aversion is a central tenet in financial econom-
ics. However, the debate as to the magnitude of the
coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) is one
that has long been at the forefront of the field and the
economics of uncertainty in general. In simulating
many of the popular models in finance, the coefficient
of risk aversion is a free parameter that requires
calibration. In their famed paper on the ‘equity
premium puzzle’, Mehra and Prescott (1985) argue
that values greater than 10 are implausibly large.
Both Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) and Lucas (1994)
state that even 10 is an extreme case, with Lucas
arguing that any ‘solution’ to the equity premium
puzzle that relies on a CRRA greater than 2.5 is
unlikely to be broadly accepted.
Since the early 1970s, research on the CRRA has
spawned a voluminous literature. In his seminal
work, Arrow (1971) argued that due to the bounding
conditions of the utility function, the coefficient
should be close to unity. Ever since, there have been
numerous studies, spanning different fields of eco-
nomics providing estimates of this parameter and
values needed to match the data in simulated models.
Friend and Blume (1975) use information on asset
holdings, income and other demographics for a large
cross-section of households and conclude that the
CRRA is greater than unity and ‘is more likely to be
in excess of two’. Generally, estimates from finance
applications tend to be large. An exception is Hansen
and Singleton (1982) who report estimates between
0.35 and 1. However, Mehra and Prescott (1985)
require the CRRA to be in excess of 10 (and may be
as high as 50) to reconcile the large premium paid by
equity with theoretical models. Szpiro (1986) using
data from insurance markets finds support for
constant relative risk aversion with a coefficient
between 1.2 and 1.8. However, Blake (1996) finds
estimates vary with wealth level, with the poorest and
richest groups exhibiting CRRA of 47.60 and 7.88
respectively. Clare et al. (1998) investigate the
appropriateness of the CAPM for the UK market
and fail to reject a CRRA of 2, an often-hypothesised
value in calibrated models. More recently,
Aı¨t-Sahalia and Lo (2000) provide estimates of
CRRA using option-pricing models and find esti-
mates ranging from 1 to 60, with a weighted average
of 12.7.
In testing the CAPM, Engel and Rodrigues (1989),
Giovannini and Jorion (1989) and Thomas and
Wickens (1993) generate estimates of the CRRA.
However these are generally highly implausible, often
negative for a static covariance matrix and not
statistically significantly different from zero for
time-varying specifications of the conditional covar-
iance matrix.
The present study sheds new light on the issue by
focusing exclusively on estimating the CRRA. A
simple mean-variance framework is used and it shows
that by fully covering the range of assets in a typical
portfolio and employing time-varying covariance
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matrices as risk measures, even such a simple model
can provide estimates of CRRA that are consistent
with theoretical values. Previously, estimation of
time-varying covariance matrices for a broad range
of assets proved difficult but here one adopts the
highly flexible dynamic conditional correlation
(DCC) specification of the multivariate GARCH
model due to Engle (2002). This allows one to capture
changes in the investment opportunity set and assess
the reaction of portfolio managers.
The approach is closest in spirit to Engel and
Rodrigues (1989), Giovannini and Jorion (1989) and
Thomas and Wickens (1993), but differs in a number
of important aspects that are likely to influence the
parameter of interest in the analysis. First, the present
study is the only one to focus exclusively on
estimating the coefficient of risk aversion. The
others concentrate on tests of the CAPM with the
CRRA being a by-product rather than the focus of
the test. Second, it uses the actual weights employed
by portfolio managers as opposed to the CAPM
weights. Therefore it is not imposing any restrictions
on the portfolio allocations. Given that observed
asset weights differ substantially from those implied
by the CAPM, the analysis represents actual financial
market behaviour and hence should provide a better
estimate of risk aversion amongst fund managers.
The CRRA from the other studies indicates the
degree of risk aversion required for the CAPM
to hold rather than that displayed by market
participants. Third, employing the highly flexible
DCC version of the multivariate GARCH model
allows one to increase the asset coverage in the
analysis. Other studies constrain their asset coverage
to include only the largest markets. While this is a
legitimate approach, the portfolio effects of the
smaller and often less correlated markets are inevi-
tably omitted. In the present model, the attractiveness
of such markets is captured through the (time-
varying) covariance terms. The decision of the fund
manager as to whether or not to invest in such assets
can be quite revealing as to their attitudes to risk.
The study focuses on two classes of funds;
aggressively managed and balanced managed funds.
Both undertake significant international diversifica-
tion and are therefore most consistent with theoret-
ical models. Irish funds are worthy of attention for a
number of reasons. First, the domestic equity market
is small, accounting for less than 1% of world market
capitalization, making international investment a
necessary vehicle for portfolio choice. Second,
Ireland’s tradition and culture mean that agents
may be more familiar with foreign markets and less
prone to overstating the risk of foreign assets.
Assuming that fund managers are mean-variance
optimizers, their implied CRRA is estimated.
The results show that aggressively managed funds
exhibit lower risk aversion with CRRA estimates
ranging from 1.69 to 2.42. Balanced managed funds
typically hold more riskless assets and consequently,
CRRA estimates vary between 3.21 and 3.78.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows;
Section II outlines the mean-variance framework on
which the estimations are based. Section III discusses
the econometric model and the data employed.
Section IV presents the results and discusses their
implications while Section V contains concluding
remarks.
II. Mean-Variance Framework
It is assumed that fund managers adopt a simple
mean-variance framework1 (as in Engel and
Rodrigues, 1989; Giovannini and Jorion, 1989;
Thomas and Wickens, 1993) to allocate funds
among various asset classes. This is consistent with
myopic investment and a single period model such as
the CAPM. Even in a multi-period setting, Shleifer
and Vishney (1997) argue that fund managers can be
motivated to take a myopic view in their investing
strategies if less sophisticated investors use short-term
returns to evaluate their performance or competence.
Hence it is argued that the assumed framework is
justified. There is a representative manager who seeks
to maximize end-of-period real wealth, given infor-
mation available at the beginning of the period.
MaxU½EtðWtþ1Þ,VtðWtþ1Þ, U1 > 0,U2 < 0 ð1Þ
where Et is the conditional expectation of end-
of-period wealth, Wtþ1, and Vt is the conditional
variance. One can write
EtðWtþ1Þ ¼ Wt þWtx0tEtrtþ1 þWtð1 x0tiÞrf ð2Þ
and its variance as
VtðWtþ1Þ ¼ W2t x0tVtðrtþ1Þxt ð3Þ
xt, rtþ1 and i are n-vectors of portfolio asset weights,
asset returns and ones respectively. The risk free rate
is denoted by rf. Vt(rtþ1) refers to the conditional
variance-covariance matrix of asset returns. The
excess return on the portfolio between t and tþ 1 is
given by;
rp,tþ1  rf ¼ x0tðrtþ1  rfÞ ð4Þ
1 This framework is compatible with any utility function as long as returns are multivariate normally distributed.
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Substituting Equations 2 and 3 into Equation 1 and
maximizing with respect to xt gives the first order
conditions:
dU
dxt
¼ U1WtðEtrtþ1  rfÞ þU2W2t Vtðrtþ1Þxt ¼ 0 ð5Þ
Defining the coefficient of relative risk
aversion, t¼2(U2/U1)Wt, and re-arranging the
above expression, one obtains the following
condition;
Etðrtþ1  rfÞ ¼ tVtðrtþ1Þxt ð6Þ
Assuming that agents are rational, one obtains the
equation that one wants to estimate:
rtþ1  rf ¼ tVtðrtþ1Þxt þ "tþ1 ð7Þ
This equation gives one a relationship between asset
returns, the risk associated with each asset, the
correlation structure between each pair of assets, the
coefficient of relative risk aversion and the portfolio
weight attributed to each asset.
III. Econometric Model and Data
The model
A key feature of Equation 7 is that one requires an
estimate of the conditional variance of asset returns.
There is now ample evidence that this matrix is time
varying (Bollerslev et al., 1988; Clare et al., 1998
among others). The development of the family of
(G)ARCH models (Engle, 1982; Bollerslev, 1986) has
made it possible to allow the covariance matrix to be
continuously changing. They also capture other
features of asset returns such as thick tails and
volatility clustering. As the focus is on portfolio
diversification, it’s necessary to adopt a multivariate
GARCH specification. A well-documented problem
of estimating these models lies in the vast number of
potential parameters to be estimated simultaneously.2
A recent advance due to Engle (2002) combines the
parsimony of earlier specifications with a model
sufficiently flexible to incorporate time-varying con-
ditional correlations. For an n-vector of asset returns,
the model requires the estimation of n variances but it
is assumed that the time variation of the covariance
elements stems from a common source and can be
captured by just two parameters. Thus the n(n 1)/2
covariance terms can be modelled for the price of
two additional parameters. This is the technique
adopted here.
A multivariate GARCH-in-mean model is
estimated. It is specified as follows:
rtþ1 ¼ Vtðrtþ1Þxt þ "tþ1
"tþ1  Nð0,Htþ1Þ
Htþ1 ¼ Dtþ1tþ1Dtþ1
ð8Þ
D is a diagonal matrix of conditional standard
deviations, which is generated by
Dt ¼ V0Vþ Að"i,t1"i,t1ÞA0 þ BðDt1ÞB0 ð9Þ
 is a time-varying correlation matrix with typical
element given by
ij,t ¼ hij,tffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
hii,thjj,t
p where
hij, t ¼ ijð1  Þ þ ð"i,t1"j, t1Þ þ ðhij, t1Þ
ð10Þ
where ij is the unconditional expectation of the
correlation between i and j.
The data
The goal is to estimate the CRRA from Equation 8.
Data are used on asset holdings of two classes of Irish
mutual funds: aggressively managed and balanced
managed funds. The asset holdings for both funds are
monthly averages of all the investment firms operat-
ing in this market. Average behaviour is taken to be
more indicative of market behaviour. Approximately
20 and 50 funds operate in the aggressively and
balanced managed categories respectively.3 These
data are obtained from Moneymate and the study
also relies on their fund classifications. Moneymate
categorize aggressively managed funds as those with a
mix of equities, fixed interest, property, cash and a
minimum 65% real asset exposure. Balanced mana-
ged funds also contain a mix of the above asset types
but only require a 40% real asset exposure. All funds
are monitored on a monthly basis.
The sample extends from January 1993 to
December 2002. Figures 1 and 2 plot the asset
holdings of aggressively and balanced managed
funds respectively. As expected, balanced funds
have relatively larger holdings in the risk-free asset.
Consistent with the phenomenon of ‘home bias’ in
portfolio composition, Irish funds disproportion-
ately hold domestic assets. The degree of interna-
tional diversification is less than suggested by
2Bollerslev et al. (1994) provide an excellent review of this topic along with a number of parsimonious parameterizations used
in the literature.
3 Further details on the funds are available from the author.
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financial theory. However, the allocation to Irish
equity has fallen over time, with an offsetting
growth in other Euro zone equities.
Asset holdings are not given by individual assets
but by geographical breakdown. Therefore one
assumes that the foreign asset holdings have a
beta of unity with respect to their regional index.
Returns on these assets are computed using
Datastream constructed indices for each region.
Rates of return in excess of the risk-free rate are
worked with to prevent volatility in this variable
from overstating portfolio risk. The risk free rate is
proxied by the one-month money market rate.
Nominal returns are converted to real returns using
monthly inflation calculated from the CPI for all
items.
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Riskless asset
Long bond
Far east equity
US equity
Euro equity
UK equity
Irish equity
Ja
n-9
3
Ja
n-9
4
Ja
n-9
5
Ja
n-9
6
Ja
n-9
7
Ja
n-9
8
Ja
n-9
9
Ja
n-0
0
Ja
n-0
1
Ja
n-0
2
Ju
l-9
3
Ju
l-9
4
Ju
l-9
5
Ju
l-9
6
Ju
l-9
7
Ju
l-9
8
Ju
l-9
9
Ju
l-0
0
Ju
l-0
1
Ju
l-0
2
Fig. 1. Geographical breakdown of Aggressively Managed Funds
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Ja
n-9
3
Ma
y-9
3
Se
p-9
3
Ja
n-9
4
Ma
y-9
4
Se
p-9
4
Ja
n-9
5
Ma
y-9
5
Se
p-9
5
Ja
n-9
6
Ma
y-9
6
Se
p-9
6
Ja
n-9
7
Ma
y-9
7
Se
p-9
7
Ja
n-9
8
Ma
y-9
8
Se
p-9
8
Ja
n-9
9
Ma
y-9
9
Se
p-9
9
Ja
n-0
0
Ma
y-0
0
Se
p-0
0
Ja
n-0
1
Ma
y-0
1
Se
p-0
1
Ja
n-0
2
Ma
y-0
2
Se
p-0
2
Riskless asset
Long bond
Far east equity
US equity
Euro equity
UK equity
Irish equity
Fig. 2. Geographical breakdown of Balanced Managed Funds
1358 T. Flavin
IV. Results
Discussion of results
The model outlined above was estimated using the
Quasi-maximum likelihood approach of Bollerslev
and Wooldridge (1992). Table 1 summarizes the
results. We begin with an analysis of the aggres-
sively managed funds. Using the asset weights as
in Fig. 1, the estimate of the CRRA is 1.69.
Furthermore, it is quite precisely estimated with a
standard error of 0.005. Therefore managers of
aggressively managed funds exhibit a degree of risk
aversion that is consistent with theoretical models.
A similar analysis for the balanced managed funds
shows these managers are more risk averse.
However, the estimate of 3.21, is still at the lower
end of theoretically acceptable parameters. Table 2
reports estimates of the coefficients in the second-
order moments. All are statistically significant at
conventional levels.
However, the reported asset holdings omit a
section of the investment opportunity set. In parti-
cular, the emerging markets of Latin America do not
feature in the geographical breakdown. Equation 7 is
re-estimated, including an index of emerging markets
with a zero weighting. As expected, one finds that the
CRRA is higher for both categories of fund. In the
case of aggressively managed funds the estimate
grows to 2.42, while for balanced managed funds, it
increases to 3.79.
Aggressively managed funds, which undertake
more international diversification and hence would
appear to be most consistent with theoretical
models, have coefficients between 1.69 and 2.42.
These estimates are in the range suggested by
Mehra and Prescott (1985) and also within the
more restricted range of Mankiw and Zeldes (1991)
and Lucas (1994). The estimated coefficients for the
balanced managed funds are higher and outside of
the latter range but are still statistically significantly
less than 4.
Table 2. Estimated parameters of the time-varying covariance matrix
Aggressively Aggressively Balanced Balanced*
V11 0.003 (0.00) 0.002 (0.00) 0.002 (0.00) 0.003 (0.00)
V22 0.002 (0.00) 0.002 (0.00) 0.002 (0.00) 0.002 (0.00)
V33 0.003 (0.00) 0.003 (0.00) 0.003 (0.00) 0.003 (0.00)
V44 0.001 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00)
V55 0.003 (0.00) 0.004 (0.00) 0.005 (0.00) 0.005 (0.00)
V66 0.0005 (0.00) 0.0003 (0.00) 0.0002 (0.00) 0.0003 (0.00)
V77 – 0.003 (0.00) – 0.003 (0.00)
A11 0.067 (0.00) 0.069 (0.00) 0.026 (0.00) 0.049 (0.00)
A22 0.004 (0.53) 0.009 (0.00) 0.054 (0.00) 0.095 (0.00)
A33 0.024 (0.00) 0.023 (0.00) 0.059 (0.00) 0.037 (0.00)
A44 0.376 (0.00) 0.303 (0.00) 0.303 (0.00) 0.258 (0.00)
A55 0.260 (0.00) 0.016 (0.00) 0.128 (0.00) 0.003 (0.00)
A66 0.279 (0.00) 0.046 (0.00) 0.080 (0.00) 0.095 (0.00)
A77 – 0.039 (0.00) – 0.014 (0.00)
B11 0.079 (0.00) 0.248 (0.00) 0.039 (0.00) 0.114 (0.00)
B22 0.039 (0.00) 0.091 (0.00) 0.271 (0.00) 0.077 (0.00)
B33 0.053 (0.00) 0.001 (0.02) 0.071 (0.00) 0.015 (0.00)
B44 0.222 (0.00) 0.298 (0.00) 0.087 (0.00) 0.314 (0.00)
B55 0.006 (0.24) 0.007 (0.00) 0.039 (0.00) 0.060 (0.00)
B66 0.055 (0.00) 0.017 (0.00) 0.087 (0.00) 0.062 (0.00)
B77 – 0.005 (0.00) – 0.010 (0.00)
 0.022 (0.018) 0.067 (0.00) 0.039 (0.00) 0.071 (0.00)
 0.064 (0.00) 0.484 (0.00) 0.799 (0.00) 0.528 (0.00)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are p-values. Starred columns refer to
portfolios including the emerging market index.
Table 1. Summary of results
Estimated
CRRA
Aggressively Managed Funds 1.69 (0.00)
Aggressively Managed
(inc. Emerging markets)
2.42 (0.00)
Balanced Managed Funds 3.21 (0.00)
Balanced Managed
(inc. Emerging markets)
3.78 (0.00)
*Numbers in parentheses are p-values.
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Implications of the results
One begins by analysing the implications for the
utility specification. It is common in finance applica-
tions to adopt a power utility function as it displays
many properties that are consistent with investment
behaviour.4 All of the estimated CRRAs are positive
and statistically different from zero and are thus
consistent with strictly concave, upward sloping
utility functions. This function also nests another of
the great workhorses of finance theory, the log utility
function. Log utility requires that the CRRA equals
one but this hypothesis is rejected in all cases. Hence
there is no support for the adoption of log utility.
Next, one examines the implications of the results
for portfolio selection. In particular, one focuses on
the willingness of fund managers to undertake risky
investments. One calculates the required probability
of winning an actuarially fair gamble to induce a risk-
averse individual to participate in a lottery. If an
agent is risk neutral, this probability will simply be
0.5, but a risk averse agent will require a premium.
The required probability premium is represented
by the second term on the right hand side of
Equation 115:
ðW,Þ ¼ 1
2
þ 1
4
 ð11Þ
 is the probability of winning the gamble and  is
the proportion of wealth at risk. The other variables
are defined as before. It is clear that with odds of 0.5,
a risk-neutral agent (¼ 0) will participate in the
lottery. However, for positive values of the CRRA,
the probability must be greater than one half to
induce the agent to gamble. Focusing on aggressively
managed funds, one finds that for the lower estimate
of 1.69 managers would be willing to gamble any
proportion of the portfolio provided the odds of
winning are sufficiently stacked in their favour. This
is presented in Fig. 3. One can see that to induce a
fund manager to gamble 50% of the portfolio value,
the odds of winning would have to be 0.712, while
odds of over 0.92 are required before the manager
would gamble the entire portfolio. Fig. 4 conveys
a similar story for balanced managed funds. With a
CRRA of 3.21, the fund manager would require a
90% probability of winning before gambling half of
the fund. Complete certainty is required to induce the
manager to gamble 60% of the fund.
When the emerging market index is included, the
CRRA of the aggressively managed fund implies that
there is now a maximum proportion of the fund that
a manager is willing to gamble. Without absolute
certainty of winning (¼ 1), the manager will never
gamble amounts in excess of 80% of the fund value.
In contrast to the previous case, the agent requires
80% chance of winning before gambling 50% of
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Fig. 3. Odds required by Aggressive Funds Manager to participate in actuarially fair gamble
4 For example, Cass and Stiglitz (1970) show that fund managers offering an identical portfolio to clients with different initial
wealth is only consistent with utility functions that exhibit constant relative (or absolute) risk aversion.
5 For a full derivation of this equation, see Danthine and Donaldson (2002), pp. 44–6.
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the portfolio. With a CRRA of 3.78 for the balanced
managed fund, a 97.3% probability of winning is
required before the manager would gamble half of the
fund, while only complete certainty would induce the
manager to gamble 52% of the fund. Figures 5 and 6
present these scenarios.
V. Conclusions
The present study focuses exclusively on the
estimation of the CRRA. Even using a simple
mean-variance framework, one obtains estimates of
the CRRA that are consistent with theoretically
acceptable values. The innovations in the approach
are that one covers the entire range of assets in a
typical portfolio; second, one uses actual portfolio
holdings as opposed to those implied by the
CAPM; and third, one captures the continuously
changing nature of financial markets through the
DCC multivariate GARCH model (Engle, 2002).
This technique allows one to model the time-
varying conditional covariance matrix required by
the framework.
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Fig. 5. Odds required by Aggressive Funds (Inc. Emerging Markets) Manager to participate in actuarially fair gamble
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Fig. 4. Odds required by Balanced Funds Manager to participate in actuarially fair gamble
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Data are used on two categories of funds:
aggressively and balanced managed. Aggressively
managed funds are more internationally diversified
and hence have lower levels of risk aversion. The
CRRA exhibited by these fund managers lies
between 1.69 and 2.42. Compared with previous
studies in the finance literature, the estimates are
small and nearer to the magnitudes suggested by
theory and often used in model calibration.
However, one can reject the hypothesis that
CRRA is 1 and hence find no evidence to support
the use of log utility. For the balanced managed
funds, CRRA is in the range 3.21–3.78. These are
still relatively low and lie close to the generally
accepted range of values.
The study investigates the implications of the
estimates for the behaviour of a representative fund
manager. The study computes the probability of
success required by such an agent to participate in an
actuarially fair gamble. In many cases, complete
certainty is required to induce managers into large
bets on the value of their funds.
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